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 PEACE BUILDING ARCHITECTURE 
 
 
Luc Reychler 
 
 
Peace Re-Search 
 
In the sixties the green and the peace movements alerted the international 
community of the deterioration of the environment and of the danger of nuclear 
conflicts. Since then, the green movement has been transformed into political 
parties, departments, jobs, environmental impact assessments and several 
international regimes. The first publication of the Club of Rome in 1972, Limits of 
Growth, had a catalyzing effect for raising life and death questions that confront 
mankind and claiming that planetary planning was the most important business on 
earth (Meadows 1972). The peace movement, on the other hand, evolved 
differently. There were some peak moments such as the peace marches in the 
eighties, but the impacts were weaker and less decisive. One explanation is that the 
peace movement had to cope with the strong bureaucracies of foreign offices and of 
defense departments that claimed the expertise. Another explanation is that a great 
deal of the peace movement does not define peace as a collective good. Being 
removed from the embedded conflict gives a false sense of apartness making some 
conflicts seem irrelevant to societies at peace. The possibility of cruise missiles 
hitting peaceful countries caused huge peace marches; the snipers in Sarajevo did 
not. A third reason is that costs of violence continue to be underestimated because 
of inadequate estimates of the price of failed conflict prevention (Reychler 1999a).  
The last explanation concerns the state of peace research.  Despite a great 
deal of progress and creativity, the field remains hampered by three weaknesses 
(Reychler 1992, pp. 89-96). First, there is a lack of field experience or close 
cooperation between professionals in the field and peace researchers. A synergy 
between the speculari and operari (‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’) would enhance the peace 
building business considerably. Second, there is a one-dimensional quality of peace 
building; the negative side effects of many well-intentioned projects have been 
documented.1 Finally, there is a ‘toolbox approach’ to peace building. The result is 
that too many conflicted countries end up with piles of peace building stones, and 
no sustainable peace building.  
Despite all this, peace research is quickly reducing the gap with the green 
movement. The prevention of violent conflicts has become a major point on the 
agendas of foreign offices not only in the U.S. and in Europe, but also of major 
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU).2 The driving forces were not of moral or legal nature, but cost-benefit 
considerations. Once a conflict crosses the threshold of violence it becomes much 
more difficult and costly to manage it. Political, social, cultural, ecological, 
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psychological and spiritual costs join the already considerable costs of humanitarian 
suffering or economic destruction (Reychler 1999b). The human costs of failed 
conflict prevention or transitional aid are very high. The process of transition in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, had huge 
development costs, many of which are still unabated (UNDP 1999). Human costs 
refer to the loss of lives, the high levels of disease, poverty, socio-economic 
disparity, rising gender inequality, educational decline, unemployment and many 
less tangible costs. It has become clear that proactive conflict prevention (that is, 
efforts made before a conflict has escalated) is more cost effective than reactive 
conflict prevention (that is, efforts made after a conflict has become violent to 
contain and reduce the intensity, duration and the possibility of geographic spill 
over) (Brown and Rosecrance 1999). There is a growing perception that there are 
limits to the level of violence the world can permit. It has become clear that 
sustainable development is impossible without sustainable peace building. This 
paper tackles one of the challenges of the international community in this decade; 
namely, making the world safe from conflicts or creating a more effective system to 
prevent violence.   
 
Peace Architecture 
 
A major part of this challenge is the development of better peace 
architecture through more cost effective ways to create sustainable peace building 
processes. Strategists, designers and planners are also concerned with combining 
means and time efficiently. I found, for example, nearly one hundred peace plans 
drafted before the Second World War. There is a great deal of flexibility and 
overlapping in the meaning of the terms strategy, design, planning and architecture. 
The term strategy continues to be strongly associated with states or their alliances 
which are designed to focus on security, enemies and threats through the use of 
military force and command. The term peace plan is also quite restrictive. Most 
peace plans are legal blueprints for the creation of world peace or are too abstract in 
context. The term design has more appeal, but it is associated with the construction 
of conflict management systems or with business (for example, practice oriented 
towards the development of products, tools, components and processes) (Magolin 
and Buchanan, 1998).3   
I prefer to use the metaphor ‘peace architecture’ because (a) it draws 
attention to the architectural principles/considerations that have to be addressed in 
sustainable peace building processes; (b) it emphasizes the need to identify the 
necessary pre-conditions or building blocks for different types of conflicts; (c) it 
could shorten the learning curve by providing a methodology for comparative 
analysis and evaluation of conflict transformation; and (d) it could contribute to 
greater attention paid to the vital role of peace architects.  
 
Architectural Considerations and Principles 
 
The image of peace architecture suggests that peace building is not only a 
science but also an art, where imagination and creativity are an essential part of the 
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building process. This conveys the need for professional peace architects and 
architectural teams, and it draws attention to the key principles of the architecture 
process. Following are six principles that should guide the design of peace building 
processes.  
 
1. A clear and compelling definition of the peace to be built. This requires a 
reconciling of the competing needs of the owners and the concerns of the 
stakeholders who will have to share the same fate; imaging a more attractive future; 
and an estimation of the costs. 
2. A contextual and comprehensive assessment of the available peace 
building capacity with appreciative inquiry and of what still needs to be done to 
build a sustainable peace building process. 
3. The development of a coherent peace plan. Coherence refers to the 
achievement of good time management and of a synergy between peace building 
efforts in diverse domains, at different system-levels and layers of the conflict.  
 
Table 1: Coherence between Domains, Levels, Time-factors  
  and Layers of a Conflict 
 
            Levels/Actors 
-international -  global 
                      -  regional 
                      -  sub-regional 
-national        -  elite 
                      -  middle 
                      -  local 
 
    Domains/Measures 
                -diplomatic 
                -political 
                -economic 
                -humanitarian 
                -education 
                -information 
                -military 
    Time-factors 
   -timing of 
entry/exit 
 -lead time: long,    
middle, short 
 -synchronic or 
sequential 
 - duration 
           Layers 
-public layers 
        -public behavior/opinion
-deeper layers 
-private opinion, 
perceptions, wishes, 
expectations, feelings, 
emotions, historical 
memory 
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4. An effective implementation of the peace plan. This involves not only the 
commitment of sufficient time and means to build the sustainable peace process, but 
also coordination and effective leadership. 
5. The involvement/inclusion of the people who commissioned the peace 
building (the owners) and the stakeholders in the whole process. 
6. An identification and dismantling of the ‘senti-mental walls’4 that inhibit 
the peace building process.  
 
Building Blocks of Violence and Peace 
 
Another challenge of architectural analysis is the classification of different 
types of violence, peace and the identification of their causal antecedents or 
necessary preconditions. From a comparative study of the architecture of the 
genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda and Burundi, seven building blocks of genocide were 
distilled (Reychler 2000): 
 
Table 2. Building Blocks of Genocide 
 
• A country in transition with high levels of political, economic and cultural 
insecurity and frustration. 
• An authoritarian government that attributes the responsibility of the 
problems to a particular group. 
• A small group of fanatical leaders and a pliable majority. 
• A systematic dehumanization of the victimized group(s). 
• A plan for ethnic cleansing. 
• A relatively powerless victimized group. 
• An international community that disapproves morally of the genocidal 
behavior, but does not take effective measures to prevent or stop the 
massacres. 
 
Table 3: Building Blocks of Sustainable Peace Building 
 
• An effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation at 
different levels. 
• Political and economic peace enhancing structures (consolidated democracy 
and social free market system). 
• An objective and subjective security system. 
• An integrative moral political climate, characterized by the expectation of 
an attractive future resulting from cooperation, a replacement of exclusive 
nationalism with multiple loyalties, reconciliation and dismantlement of 
senti-mental walls. 
• Political, economic and security cooperation at a multilateral level. 
• A critical mass of internal and external peace building leadership.   
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Comparative Analysis and Evaluation of Peace Architectures 
 
Another challenge of architectural research is the development of ways and 
means to improve sustainable peace building processes. A comparative analysis and 
evaluation of successful and less successful peace building efforts could shorten the 
learning curve significantly. In such a comparative study, three phases could be 
distinguished. In the first phase an analysis and evaluation is made of the conflict to 
be transformed. This gives an indication of the problems to be solved and the degree 
of difficulty to be expected. The second phase involves an assessment of the results 
or the output of the peace building efforts, while the third phase focuses on the 
process.  
 
Phase 1: Analysis and Evaluation of the Conflict to Be Transformed 
 
In this part a diagnosis would be made of the actors, the issues, the 
opportunity structure, the strategic approaches of the parties involved and of the 
conflict dynamics. This gives us an idea of the type of conflict one is confronted 
with, and also allows us to estimate the costs and difficulty of the conflict 
transformation efforts. The latter implies additional data gathering and analysis of 
the peace building efforts, such as: the actors included or excluded in the peace 
process (levels/internal-external); the prescriptive or indicative nature of the 
process; the operational definition of peace; the issues addressed; the tools selected; 
the levels on which the peace efforts were focused; the layers of the conflict 
addressed; the time management; the commitment of time and means and the 
coordination of efforts. 
            
Phase 2: Evaluation of the Outcomes/Results of the Peace Building Efforts 
 
Here we focus on two criteria of effectiveness: the nature of the outcome 
and the durability. The nature of the outcome is assessed by checking how and to 
what extent the above-mentioned criteria of sustainable peace are satisfied. The 
durability is assessed by studying the installation and consolidation of the necessary 
preconditions of sustainable peace.  
 
Phase 3: Evaluation of the Peace Building Process 
 
This is the most difficult part of the comparative study because it requires a 
thorough understanding of what is needed to build an effective, efficient and 
satisfactory peace building process. In the second phase, the effectiveness was 
assessed by looking at the nature of the outcome and the durability. To assess the 
efficiency one uses direct and indirect sets of measures. The first set of direct 
measures assesses the tangible and intangible costs of the transition such as the 
human, economic, social, psychological, cultural, ecological, political and spiritual 
costs; the amount of time wasted and missed opportunities and the impact of the 
transition on the nature of the relations between the conflicting parties.  
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Table 4. Evaluation of Peace Building Architecture 
 
Criteria Measurement 
Effectiveness Nature of outcome: characteristics sustainable peace 
Durability: installation and consolidation of building blocks 
Efficiency  Direct measures: costs/time/relations 
Indirect measures of factors that are assumed to enhance 
efficiency, such as inclusiveness of the process, early 
warning of threats and opportunities, effective negotiation 
and mediation efforts, etc.   
Satisfaction  With the process 
With the relationship 
With the outcome 
 
 
The second set of indirect measures studies the series of factors that tend to 
enhance or inhibit transition processes. The efficiency of the peace building process 
influences several variables below. 
 
The involvement of the people who view themselves as deeply affected by 
the peace building process. The inclusion or exclusion of the owners and 
stakeholders makes the difference between failure and success. The people who see 
their interest as deeply affected should be at the heart of the decision making 
process. Others who should be included, consulted or informed are: those who could 
hinder the successful implementation; those whose advise or assistance is needed; 
and those whose approval will be required to enable the project to proceed 
(Kraybill, 1995).  
Effective communication, consultation, negotiation and mediation process. 
This implies an evocative rather than a prescriptive approach and an acquaintance 
with effective negotiation and mediation methods that tend to enhance win-win 
agreements with low transaction costs, good relations and durable outcomes. 
A contextual and comprehensive analysis of the problems which are 
responsible for the conflict.5 Special attention should be directed to the components 
of sustainable peace that need to be absent, installed or consolidated. 
An appreciative inquiry of the strengths and the peace potential in the 
conflict ridden zone. In contrast to the problem-oriented approach — which focuses 
on the past, the problems, and the weaknesses — an appreciative inquiry turns the 
attention to the future and the strengths on which peace could be built.  
A clear and compelling definition of peace. The conflict behavior of the 
parties is strongly influenced by their respective expectations about the future. 
Therefore, the projection of a clear and attractive future could catalyze the conflict 
transition process significantly. Peace architects such as Jean Monnet, succeeded in 
convincing the Europeans that cooperation would bring them not only security, but 
also freedom and affluence. In other cases, the parties will have to negotiate a better 
future by reconciling competing values. 
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The battery of tools used in the conflict transformation process. (For 
example, European Community). These tools should be related to the specific peace 
building needs in the conflict zone.    
The coherence of the peace building plan. Here we look at the synergy or 
the interaction of actions such that the total effect is greater than the sum of the 
individual effects. Attention is paid to the cross impact of the efforts in different 
domains (political, diplomatic, military, humanitarian, economic, etc.); at different 
levels (internal and external – elite/middle/local); on different layers (public 
behavior, opinions, perceptions, feelings) and time-factors. The purpose is to 
enhance the positive and synergetic impact of the peace building efforts and prevent 
and/or reduce the negative effects (Reychler 1999c, 144-162). The installation of an 
effective conflict impact assessment system (CIAS) would help considerably (Davis 
1996; Gardner 1993).  
The use of time. Time is one of the vital and nonrenewable resources that 
continue to be wasted. Time is money, but it also makes the difference between life 
and death. Many violent conflicts are examples of missed opportunities. More 
research should be undertaken about the role of time and timing in conflict 
transformation. On the agenda are issues such as: attitudes towards time (proactive 
versus reactive); the relative importance paid to the past, present and future in the 
design of a reconciliation process, (for example; the lead-time of projects); the 
preference of short-, middle- and long-term programs; the duration of the 
intervention; when to enter and exit; how to schedule the interventions 
(consequentially or simultaneously).  
Other questions should be considered, including: Can elections be 
organized when there is no agreement about power-sharing? Is there something like 
an economic threshold below which efforts for democratization are a waste of time?  
How should political democratization and economic privatization be linked? 
Intelligent early warning. An intelligent early warning system tries not only 
to anticipate threats and the risk of violent escalation, but also pays attention to the 
opportunities to intervene proactively; to the costs of different conflict 
transformation policies and the impact of planned policies, and programs or projects 
about the dynamics of the conflict. The development and installation of an effective 
conflict impact assessment system would increase the chances of a conflict 
prevention system considerably. 
Effective implementation of a peace building plan. This implies not only the 
commitment of sufficient time and means but also leadership and a good 
coordination of the peace building activities of the parties involved.  
Unlearning and dismantling of ‘senti-mental walls’. Peace building is not 
only about construction, but also about deconstruction. To analyze and transform 
conflicts, more attention needs to be paid to political-psychological variables. In 
particular, efforts should be made to identify and dismantle ‘senti-mental walls’. 
This term refers to concepts, theories, dogmas, attitudes, habits, emotions and 
inclinations that inhibit democratic transition and constructive transformation of 
conflicts. The existence of senti-mental walls increases the chances of 
misperceiving the situation and of misevaluating the interests at stake; they lower 
the motivation to act on an opportunity and hinder the development of the necessary 
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skills and know-how to overcome conflicts. The hyphenation of sentiment and 
mental to ‘senti-mental’ is done to make people aware of the emotional roots. In a 
comparative study of genocide, it became clear that the behavior of all actors was 
distorted: the victims by despair, pluralistic ignorance and political inefficacy; the 
offenders by historical falsification, stereotyping, dehumanization, distrust and 
indifference; the third parties by neutralism/passivity/non-intervention, cultural 
arrogance, moral-legal approach and the preference to wait until the conflict is 
‘ripe’; the analysts by one-dimensional analysis, the use of invalid theories, pseudo-
scientific doctrines/myths/taboos, elitist analysis, wrong assessment of future 
developments, etc. 
A critical mass of peace building leadership. Without a critical mass of 
external and internal leadership, who motivates, guides and commits people to the 
peace building process, the chances of successful peace building are very low. 
Could a leader make a difference in bringing people together? Do unfortunate 
countries lack leadership or is the level of conflict sometimes too powerful for any 
leader to overcome (Lederach 1997)? The premise is that an essential ingredient of 
sustainable peace building is a critical mass of leadership that can raise hope, 
generate ways and means to reach the goals, and commit people to the peace 
building process. The critical mass of leadership needed depends on the specific 
conflict context. It could include internal and external leadership; some conflicts can 
be transformed successfully with internal leadership, others necessitate external 
leadership to support the process. 
The internal leadership to be involved could be situated at different levels. 
The top level comprises the key political and military leaders in the conflict 
(Monnet 1976). These people are the highest representative leaders of the 
government and opposition movements or present themselves as such. The middle 
range leadership is not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority or 
structures of the formal or major opposition movements. They could be highly 
respected individuals or persons who occupy formal positions of leadership in 
sectors such as education, business, religion, agriculture, health or humanitarian 
organizations. The grassroots leadership includes people who are involved in local 
communities, members of indigenous non-governmental organizations carrying out 
relief projects for local populations, health officials and refugee camp leaders. 
 
Process 
 
The overall aim is to create a win-win situation or a mutually benefiting 
sense of interdependence between all the parties involved and to embed the peace 
building into institutions that reinforce and sustain the process. Jean Monnet 
stressed repeatedly the importance of helping the Europeans to see their common 
interests (leur intérêt commun). He also pleaded for the creation of ‘supranational’ 
institutions (such as the European commission), which could facilitate the 
cooperation process (Kraybill 1995).  Sustainable peace is seen (a) as the result of a 
reconciliation of competing values, interests and needs, such as freedom, justice, 
affluence, security, truth, mercy and dignity, and (b) as flourishing best in a 
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consolidated democratic environment. A great deal of effort is spent on the 
development of a good process (Bennis and Nanus 1985, p. 224).  
The process is inclusive. Monnet insisted on talking to all participants 
(government, business, unions, etc.) to engage all the stakeholders in the peace 
building process. The assumption is that parties to a conflict will work more 
effectively at a resolution if they have personal stakes in the successful outcome of 
the process (Global Excellence Management 1999).  
There is the belief that nothing positive can be expected from a peace plan 
build on unequal grounds rules. Monnet insisted on negotiating on the basis of 
equality and did not accept the idea of primus inter pares.  
In order to build confidence, the process is made transparent. All plans 
Monnet proposed were clear and simple. He believed trust could be achieved by 
presenting unambiguous plans that would substantiate the peace process through 
mutually beneficial goals. When initially some negotiators were suspicious, little by 
little, they saw that there was nothing to hide.   
The problem solving approach is enriched with an appreciative inquiry 
(Monnet 1976, p. 273). Appreciative inquiry is a far more complex process than the 
simple positive thinking approach with which it is sometimes confused. It involves 
challenging the status quo by envisioning a preferred future and identifying the 
existing peace building potential. Both the identification of the strengths and the 
articulation of a realistic and attractive future, a condition that is in some important 
ways better than what now exist, can accelerate the conflict transformation 
considerably.       
Another characteristic of peace builders is their proactive mindset. Monet 
was a mover, not a care-taker. He not only envisioned a European Union, but he 
also tried to assess the impact of policy alternatives proactively.  
Characteristic is the open-minded search for alternative means to build 
peace in an efficient way. Peace builders are not orators who instinctively know the 
solution. Peace builders make a distinction between interests and positions and 
search actively for formulas that satisfy all conflicting parties. In some cases, this 
could mean integrative solutions (such as the creation of a European Union, the new 
South Africa or the unification of East and West Germany) or a disintegrative 
solution, such as the relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Empire or the 
smooth divorce of the Slovak and Czech people. A great deal of time is taken out to 
search for and develop alternative solutions.       
Decisions are not made on the basis of pressures or emotions, but on their 
merit. Essential is the use of fair and objective standards and procedures for 
evaluating alternative policy options. To convey the costs and benefits of alternative 
futures Monnet made ample use of balance sheets.    
It is important to engage and network with the leaders of different domains 
and at different levels in the process. Monnet did not perform as a prima donna, but 
preferred to give the limelight to the politicians: “Since they take the risks, they 
should have the laurels” (Europa Notities 1996, p. 400).6    
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Conclusion 
 
To research more systematically the characteristics of peace architects such 
as Jean Monnet would significantly contribute to more effective peace building. It 
would not only help to identify and strengthen the peace building potential, but also 
to track and weaken the spoilers in the peace building process. It could also 
eliminate some of the stereotypical images of peace builders, such as the image of 
passive pacifists. They do not only construct, but also need to deconstruct. They cut 
through dogmas, taboos, doctrines, etiquette, cynicism and others sentimental 
obstacles on the way to progress. Monnet challenged the ideas of political prestige 
and economic protectionism; he pleaded for supra-nationalism and questioned the 
belief in ‘archenemies’ or the existence of a politically independent economic 
sphere. He was a professional with a cause. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Since the publication of Mary Anderson’s, Do No Harm: Supporting Capacities 
for Peace through Aid, many studies have highlighted the negative impact of uni-
dimensional well-intentioned efforts (humanitarian and structural aid, peace 
keeping, democratization, etc) on the peace building process. The work done by 
Peter Uvin has been remarkable.  
 
2. For the European Union, see for example Conflict Prevention Network (1999).   
 
3. See also K. Slaikeu and R. H. Hasson (1998); C. A. Constantino and C. S. 
Merchant (1996); and W. L. Ury, J. M. Breet and S. Goldberg (1988). 
 
4. See page 31 for a description of ‘senti-mental walls’. 
 
5. A useful typology of impact can be found in M. A. Max-Neef (1991). He 
distinguishes destroying – impact, pseudo-impact, inhibiting impact, singular 
impact, synergic impact and exogenous and endogenous impacts. 
 
6. See also M. Kohnstamm (1981) and Jean Monnet (1976). 
   
References 
 
Anderson, Mary. Do No Harm: Supporting Capacities for Peace through Aid. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 
Bennis, Warren and Burt Nanus. Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge. New 
York: Harper and Rows, 1985, pp.244. 
Brown, Michael and Richard Rosecrance. “Comparing Costs of Prevention and 
Costs of Conflict: Toward a New Methodology”, in M. Brown and R. 
Rosecrance, The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in Global Arena. 
Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. 
Luc Reychler 35
Conflict Prevention Network. Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in 
Developing Countries: A Practical Guide. Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 1999.   
Constantino, Cathy A. and Christina Sickles Merchant. Designing Conflict 
Management Systems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996. 
Davis, Steven. Leadership in Conflict: The Lessons of History. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996. 
Global Excellence Management. Appreciative Inquiry: Practitioner’s Handbook. 
Washington, D.C.: Weatherhead School of Management, 1999. 
Gardner, Howard. Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity. New York: Basic 
Books, 1993.  
Gardner, Howard, Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership. New York: Basis 
Books, 1996. 
Kraybill, Ron. Development,Conflict and the RDP: A Handbook on Process 
Centered Development. Cape Town: Center for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town 
University, 1995.  
Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 
Magolin, V. and R. Buchanan, eds. The Idea of Design. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1998.  
Max-Neef, Manfred A. Human Scale Development. New York: The Apex Press, 
1991.  
Meadows, D. et al. The Limits of Growth. New York: Universe Books, 1972. 
Monnet, Jean. Mémoires. Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1976. 
Reychler, Luc. “Peace Research II”, in J. Nobel, ed., The Coming of Age of Peace 
Research. Groningen: Styx, 1992. 
Reychler, Luc. Democratic Peace Building: The Devil Is in the Transition. Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 1999a. 
Reychler, Luc. “Peace Is Worth Money” (“Vrede Is Geld Waard”), paper presented 
at the University of Amsterdam, 1999b. 
Reychler, Luc. “The Conflict Impact Assessment System (CIAS)”, in P. Cross and 
G. Rasamoelina, eds, Conflict Prevention Policy in the European Union, 
Yearbook 1998/99. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden: SWP-Conflict 
Prevention Network, 1999c, pp. 144-162.  
Reychler, Luc, et. al. A Blueprint for Genocide. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
2000. 
Slaikeu, Karl and Ralph H. Hasson. Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to 
Design a System for Your Organization. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1998. 
UNDP. Human Security in South-East Europe. New York: UNDP, 1999.  
UNDP. Transition 1999: Human Development Report for Central and Eastern 
Europe and the CIS. New York: UNDP, 1999. 
Ury, William L., et al. Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the 
Costs of Conflict. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988. 
Uvin, Peter. Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, 1998. 
